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Conueyances

of Land in

Defraud of Creditors

in New York State.

By way of introduction to the treatment of
I cannot,

I think,

do better than to make a brief

from a paper by J,1r.

John Reynolds of Brooklyn,

the New York State Bar Association,
ing,

held

ber,

1879.
Kr.

veyances

in

the city of Albany,

Reynolds says:

'

quotation

read before

at its Third Annurl Meet

on the 13th day of Novem-

NThe law governing fraudulent con-

is as yet unsettle,

forrnul , tive state.

this subject

There is

and at the present day in

a

no rational ground for surprise

that this branch of the law should at this late day still
be unformed; on the contrary,
that such must be
is

a subtle one,

This is

the case.

it
The

might be inferred,A
theory on -vhich it

and of late development in

rests

a.ny leahal system

well illustrated by the Boman Law.

The earliest remedies of creditors
system were

al-,ays

of the debtor.
SCAR~of

RIORI,

in

a crude legal

against the person and not the property

A btriking example of this is

the Roman Law.

At Rome in

the

certain cases,

tor might be taken and sold into slavery if

"IN PART7S
Lim deb-

he could not make

the necessary arrangements with his creditors for his re-

lease.

I inally,

the remedies against the person were

ani a complete system for annullihf

fers,

and securing the debtors estate for creditors,

provided, in LI3ErR
of

ngland in

in

all cases,

42 of the Digest of Justinian.

early times,

trans-

fraudulent

away,

taken

was
The Law

by allowing imprisonment for debt

at the o,tion of the creditor,

effectually

operated IN T!RROR7iM against t.e debtors person, to prevent
fraudulent

transfers; but its operation.was temporarily neut-

ralized to some extent, at an early stage of legal developmenit,

by the protection against the arrest of

Sanctuaries".

ence,

arose a spasmodic and rrezatur

of fraudulent conveyances
time for their normal,

in

"npland,

far in

e"

a

the Twyneaand

crop

advance of the
This occasioned

natural development.

the passage of the statute 13th of 7lizabeth,
and the adjudication of

:-btors ir

and others,

others similar.

By the recent abolishment of imprisonment for debt,
law no longer prevents fraudulent conveyances.
sprung up aroundj us in
vious experience.
it

They have

frightful numbers beyond all

pre-

Modern law, accordingly, has presented to

,that the early la* n.ver had,

neutralize the fraudulent
prevent.

the

the rressing problem how to

transfers

,hich

it

has ceased to

in

The greatest advances
governs conveyances,

the law w-hich

the branch of

have been made

in modern cases,

e abolishmnt of imprisornent for debt..

since

The advances

ready made by modern courts of Equity in neutralizing
tors transfers aL fraudulent,

clearly marked and is

of the states of
-1 the courts.

deb-

are but stepping, stones to

further advances yet to come.
is

al-

This progress

nland and in

In

universal.

and tendency

this country. this policy is well
Of all the states,

perhaps,

all

recognized

New Jersey and

Alabama are at present the most advanced,

but they simply

head

this direction.

tne universal march of t-e

,tates

The policy of New York State in
highly conservative .

in

this matter has been

She has been one of the slowest to

respond to this universal

tendency.

This

7:

ay be illustrat

od

by New York's repudiation of the great decision of Chancellor Kent in Reade vs.

Livingston.

In New York there has

been a constant struggle arainst this conservative
tism towards debtors;indeed,

favori-

there was actually an open

quarrel between th1 e Supereme Court and the Court of Errors
on this matter.

But since the T-hew York Court of Appeals

has succeeded to the Court of Errors,
has been taken.

much stronger ground

New Yori' has rapidly caught up with most of

the other states,
is

and has recently z.ade marked advances,

shown by soe of

as

the leading cases lately decided:

Carpenter vs. Roe;.(10 N.i., 227)
Savage vs. 'Kurphy, (34 N.Y., 508;)
134;
Case vs. Phelps, (39 N. Y.,
633;)"
N.Y.,
.(33
Jialcolm,
vs.
Cole
I have made the above quotation (;4ith one or two interpolations),

somewhat at length, because it gives in an ab-

breviated manner,
al doctrine,

a sketch of

the development of

the gener-

and of tne position NewYork has taken in

the

premises, a freati deal beter than I could have hoped to
have done it.
New York State was, as is sucggested by the writer of
the a'o e i ot to
thaove iuotation, slow to lay down stringent rules tending toward the invalidation of conveyances in defraud of
cre'ditors.

Chancellow Kent(in 2 Johns. Ch.,35)endeavored

to law down a strict rule.

In this case he said, DIf the

deed is admitted t6 be fraudulent

_n the part of the gran-

tor, there would be difficulty in allowing it to stand, even if the grantee were innocent of t'he fraud.
This case w s distinguished and an entirely different
rule laid down i:. the case of Viaterbury vs. Sturdevant, 18th
of Aend.,333,

by Senator Edwards.

of the court, he says:

In delivering the

opinion

"To render the conveyance fraudulent

and void, there should be fraudulent intent on the part of

the grantee, as well as the grantor. "

though obviously too bread and too general in
will I think,

illustrate

holding

This latter

its statenent,

tne caution with -Aihich

te

4ew

York courts dealt with this problem.
The Newv York Statutes though not differing essentially
from the English statute, nas some peculiarities.

So I have

thought best to set out at length such parts of the ttatute
as pertain to the subject under consideration.
The provisions of

tnis statute are found in sections

1,4 and 5 of Chapt-er VII, Title III, of

the Revised Statutes,

and are as follows:
Section 1.

7very conveyance of assignment, in writing

or otherwise, of any estate of- interes-t in lands, made Nith
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or otner persons of their lawful suits, da.1aies, forfeitures,debts, or
de:-iands, shall be void.

Sec tion 4.

The question of fraudulent intent, in all

cases arising under the provisions of this Chapter,

shall

be deemed a question of fact and not of law: nor shall any
conveyance or charge be deemed fraudulent, as against creditor- or purchasers, solely on the around that it .as not
founded on a valuable consideration.
Sec tion 5.

The provisions of this Chapter shall not be

construed in any maznner to affect or impair the title
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless it

shall

appear that such purchaser ha,- previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his inmediate frntor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.
Hefe to, we icy notice tLe reluctance of New York State
to lay down riles whereby to interfere with titles already
veted; section - of the statute was evidently enacted to
emphasize the rule, already existing,
es for value were not to be

that bona fide purchas-

eddled with, anid,

it has been

claimed to make more plain the difference between voluntary
conveyances and those for value in the application of this
doctrine.

The principle upon which this le, islation is founded,
and towards which all courts are working,
.

eynolds,

"that

is , to luote from

ie entire property of ;vhi~h the debtor

is the real or beneficial owner, constitutes a fund which is
primarily applicable to the fullest extent of its entire
to the payments of its owners deb - s

value,

will not be allowed
plication,

if

how th

that value

to be withdrawn from such primary ap-

any legal or equitable ground can be found,

which to prevent such
'ith

and

ithdra4l.

on

"

this principle in view, I shall endeavor
doctrine has been applied in

this state,

to find
and to note

whether the courts have applied this principle to its fullest extent in their adjudications.

Subject

latter of the Conveyance.

In order tniat a conveyance

kay ba set aside as fraudu-

lent, the subject liatter of the transfer

nut be of such a

kind that it might have been applied by the creditor to the
The old "nglish law held that a

pay:zent of his charge.

voluntary settlement of stocks, choses in action, of of copy
holds, or of any oth1Let

property not liable to levy ai',J sale

on execution, wss not within the Statute of'

lizabeth.

These have been included by a later statute however,
only exception that I know of in
of land,

is

this country,

tie Homestead estate.

1t ,,a

an 4 the

in tne way

been neld tLia.

in-

asmuch as this estate is not liable to levy and sale under
an execution,

that a transfer of it

in defraud of creditors.

cannot be set aside as

This appearb

to be correct on

principle, for, if tle creditors, are not allowed to satisfy
their claims out of
inands,

this pvoperty w"Lhile in

no injustice is

the debtor's

done then by the transfer.

Xvvhat Creditors may take advantage
of a Fraudulent Conyeynce.
The benefits

to be derived from th- statute are not

confined

to creditors exiting

at tne

tiLe of the transfer,

but -ay extend to subsequent creditors, whose debts ha- not
been contracted at the time of the conveyance.
principle will not operate in

unless

it

But the

favor of subsequent creditors,

can be bno- n, that either tie vrantor -..ade

conveyance,

with zactual intent to hinder,

thie

delay or defraud

persons who ri-Fht become creditors, (Case vs. Phelps, 39 N..
134), or,

.,

tat 3fter the conveyance wes made, the grantor

had not sufficient :,eans. to pay his then existing debts,

nor

reL, onable expectations tnat ne would have, in which case
the lw implies that the conveyance was made with intent to
defraud creditors, or, that there are debts unsatisfied
wvhich were due at the time of the conveyance.
Savage vs.

Q,,urphy, 8 Bosw.,75;

If, at the time of bringing the action,

no debt due

when the conveyance was made re.Lains unpaid, and there is
no evidence to show that the conveyance was :iaade with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud subseiuent creditors, tife
conveyance must stand as against them.
If

a conveyance is

itors existing at'

set aside as frau :!ulent against cred

2 time, subsequent creditors are enti-

tied to participate in the application of the proceeds;

but

10.

if antecedent creditors cannot make out a case, subsequent
crePditors cannot impeach it on account of the former prior
(Kerr on Fraud. )

indebtedness.

In case of a voluntacy conveyance, a contemporaneous
i.y have the conveyance set aside, by simply showcreditor :,
ing that the. debtor did not retain a sufficient wmount of
a subseent cred-

propetrty to pay nii then', exictinC debts;

connection with this fact, show tnat debts

in

itor, must,

time of

exist-14wing alc
of,

if

they have been paid,

of the grantee,
It

uncertain.

that t'"--

part of the orantor,

intent on ti.

have not been paid,

the conveyance,

was actual traudulent

and probably,

althought of this latter
is

probable,

however,

proposition,

that,

if

was ignorant of t'e fraudulent intent of the
nad put hiiSeif

in

on the part
I am

the vrante
rranvtor,

and

such a position that it vould work injust

ice to him to have the conveyance set aside, he would be
protected, and the conveyance ,ould be allowed to stand. The
rights of contemporaneous
hractical
difference betee . the
and subsequent creditors,
ces, is,

as affecting voluntary conveyan-

that it is not necessary tnat the former should

prove actual fraudulent intent in order to have a conveyance
set aside,

while, in

case of the latter,

fraudulent inte n

will not be presumed,

but must be proven as a matter of fact

Voluntary Conveyances.
A conveyance will not 1
cause voluntary.
provision,
lent,

This is

cound th.!at it
This rule is

or purchisers,

solely on t.he

was not founded on a valuable consideration.

applied in the case of Dygert vs.

329.

to marry,

in accordance witn tCie statutory

"No conveyance or char e shall be deemed fraud-

as against creditors

32 N.Y.,

adjudged fraudulent solely be-

I.

lhis case one Remerschnider,

Remerschnider
1iho ;cs about

made an oral aC-reement -ith
"-ife, his intended

settle upon ner certain property after
an oral contract,

to

arriage.

was void and inoperative,

T.is being

and tne convey-

ancesubseuently made in pursuance of tnis agree.ent,
voluntary settlement.
A creditor of the h'ustand,
beco::e such subseiuently to te
a recent
an= ....

conveyance,
dulent.

t,

but

vas a

'gho had
id to
e

rior to -I--

sought to have the conveyance set aside as frau-

The court held that a voluntary conveyance

P7R S' frau ulent,

and thlat on trse

is

not

fects only being shown.

the plaintiff could not recover.
Although the a,.sence of consideration is not conclusive
evidence of fraudulent intent,

it

is

;reat effect in determining as to
L)et..er

a circumstance

that has

t.±ere was or was

not such intent.
IlnICc

as

(jackson vs.

_r"ji4:,noi

ti

crantee in

a purchaser for value,
of section b of

329. )

.,

Peck 32 11.

this class of cases,

i

not

he does not come within the protctio

tie statute, and hence,

it

to prove a fraudulent intent oii his part,

is
in

not ni2cesary
o,.r

to inval-

If the intent to defraud or circum-

idate the transfer.

stance8 ,vhich in lav amount to an intent to defraud,
proven, on the part of the rrantor alone,

be

th e law will re-

Fard this as sufficient cause for ceclaring tne conveyance
void and inoperative.

( .,Mohaw'k 3ank vs.

The learned Judge here says

At-,ater,

2 Paige,

9.

'It is of no consequence,

whet 1 2 - the grantee knows of the state of tiie grantor's indebtedness or not.
hiiis creditor,

Lf the grantor committed a fraud upon

by giving a7way his property,

been reservxed for them,

the g rantee,

consideration, cannot be protected,
privy to the fraud:'

which should have

without a valuable

althought he was not

This may safely be said to be the law of this state today, as the case is

a leading one,

and has been cited with

approtal in all the latLer cases in which this principle was
involved.
The reason for this rule is

apparent.

Persons who have

given credit to the debtor,
security for their debt,

have a right to expect that the

debtor will not dispose of it
highly improbable
he fzil

relying on his property as a

such a way as to render it

in

that their debt can be collected,

to pay voluntarily.

The grantee in

such a convey-

ance loses nothing by being compelled to reconvey,
given nothing for the property,

should

as he has

while the rights of credi-

tors are at the same time protected.
The facts and circumstances from which fraudulent intent will be implied,

are numerous and varied.

in fact, ill

the circumstances surrounding the transaction may be taken
into consideration.

The very fact that the conveyance is

voluntary is strong evidence of intent to defraud,

and if

the transfer leaves the grantor wit hout sufficient resources
the conveyance is

with which to pay then existing debts,
presumed to have been fraudulent.

Carpenter vs. Roe, (10 N.Y., 227;)
Cole vs. Tyler, (35 N.Y., 73; )
Dwight

,

J.,. in delivering the opinion of the court,

in the case last above cited, says:

'lt

is not necessary

that there should be an actual fraudulent intent.

The re-

quisite fraud-may be inferred from the circumstances of the
case.

It was at one time the law that a voluntary convey-

13.

anceL by one indebted was _.,,
law,

towards his creditors;

3D fraudulent,
and no evidence

as a iiiater of
,as

allowed

to

rebut the presumption of fraud. "
Reade vs. Livingston, (3 Johns., Ch. -181. )
Fraudulent intent will Eiso be presuwed where a voluntary conveyance is
a person executeb
.I

tin

wde

anticipation of debt.

a voluntary conveyance,

Thus, when

and then pay

up

i.-debtedness by obtaining new credit and contract-

ing new liabilities,
void,

in

even as

the transfer will be fraudulent and

to subsequent creditor.,

the courts holding

t1at the prior indebtedness has not been paid but simply
transferred. The case of Case vs. Phelps, (31N.Y.,134), is
in

point.

here, a personu about to engage in

a new business

for the purpose of securing his property for the benefit of
himself and fa .ily
erty to his wife,

in

the event, of loss,

conveyed his prp-

voluntarily an.d without consideration.

conveyance was set aside as fraudulent and void,
ing the fact that it

was distinctly found

ance .,as made --,ithout any intention

The

notwithstan-

h-at the convey-

to defraud creditors

treR exis ting.
I shall not attempt to cive all the facts from w.hich
fraudulent intent ,wvill be infe.rred.
Suffice it to say tiat
any and all circumstances

tending to show that lie lrantor

conveyed away his property to get it

beyond

the reach of his

of fraudulent intent.

will be evicence

creditors,

Conveyances for Value.

to conveyances volui.tary in

been aplled

question as to ho,

it shall be applied

it

the la-N 2,

HavinE diLcussed somewhat at length,

their nature,

to conveyances

ias
the
for a

valuable consideration demands so.-,e Zttention.
liection 2of the statute provides:
t~i

Chapter shall not be construed i

'Tne provision,

of

ai:: manner to effect

or impair the titIA of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless

it

shall appear that ,ucn purchaser had pre-

vious notice of txe fraudulent intent of his ii-.ediate grant
or- or of the frbud rendering void the title

of such Frantor.

Thus we see that in order to be within the protection
of

thi.

section, the

rantee

a valua' le consideration,

uist >ve been a purchaser fo'r

and in good faith.

ficient that the conveyance

is

not suf-

is for a va2juable consideration

OR in good faith; it must be both.
elements is

It

Th

concurrence

of both

essential and indespensible,(i2 Johnston, 320.1

Consideration for txLe Conveyance.
In

order that a conveyance may be considered as having

been made for a valuable

consideration,

the 'pestion of ad-

equacy is

not -aterial.

(4 Vend, 30$.), says:

Sutherland ,J.,

in

Jackson vs.Peck,

"A voluntary conveyance is' iell def in-

ed to be a deed without any valuable consideration.

The ad-

eiuacy of the consideration doeb not enter into the question

and only beco:,s
The ,ole 'iues tion is

tria1 as evidence of fraudulent intent.
wietu<:r anytiaing of vilue has passed
er."

between the parties to the tranf

B3ut the consideration must be a lefgal one,

and one that

the law -,ill recognize, or the transfer doe- not come within
tnierefore be conc;idand will
o the statute,
po
tL
,
e si o
u.Le protection o!t
and will be subject to the rules

ered a voluntFry conveyance

that kind of transfers.

governing

prior debt or obligation,
however,

it

must,

be of such a kind as

If

the consideration is

a

with a few exceptions,

to be enforciAle at law.

(3 Barb. Ch., A4.)
The principki exception to the

in

pursuance of a, agreement

voluntary,

is

where

there is

be enforced on account of

rhlat cannot be enforced is
a moral ol.ligation wiich cannot

tixe provision of some statute.

.
of limitations is
The statute

and a debt barred by it,

hat a conveyance

a statue

that 1nay be waived,

may be a good consideration for a

conveyance.

This w~s held in

(7 Hun,591.)

d&cided in 1876.

the case of Iiaie vs.
The statute of

Stewart,

frauds :nay al-

and

so be waived,

ance of property,

the debt :aay be paid by mieaos of a conveyas against credi-

which will be effectual

tors.
The case of Liveri:-ore vs.
cabe where

.orthrup(14

-Ecb

a

the grantor had made an oral agreement to be res-

ponsible for tlie debt of a~iother 'arson.
this acre.:_ent,
tendant,

N.Y.,l1O),

he deeded certain property over to tae de-

which conveyance was

creditors of
inion, said:

In pursuance of

the grantor.
'It

is

atacked as fraudulent by

r2he court,

in

delivering;

entir ly within the option of

the opthe deb-

tor -xlheter he will set up the statute of frauds against the
p-erformance of such a promise, or not, and althought the
promise was verbal, honesty, as

well ac honor, required tnIat

it should be faithfully performed. "
A debt discharced by proceedings in bankruptcy may be
a good consideration, as against creditors, for a conveyance.
The reason for the rule is clear.

Ahile the remedy has been

taken away by law, the moral obligation to pay the debt remainsi

and should the debtor choose to

cannot claim that their right

o so other creditors

have been invaded.

A debt discharged by voluntary release is not-,however,
a good consideration, for, the creditor having relinquished

17.

there is

the debt itself,

ing on the former debtor,

res

no moral obligation to pay it
and a conveyance

pursuance of

in

such a debt :is voluntary.
Bona Fides of the Transfer.
In

order tiat

tors of
to in

a conveyance may stan , as against credi-

the grantor,

the contract must have been entered in-

absolute good faith on the part of t!

grntee.

it

.:.aJes no ditference -. iat might have been the intention of
t... -rantor,

if

the <grantee is

fraud or mala fides,
In
seems

free from any imputation of

he will be protected.

the early history of the doctrine,

to have arisen

courts

stated tne law.

conveyances

from the very general way is

for vLlue,

in

ta

ap,,>Jication of

does not seem to have been fully made,

the case of Dart vs.

until

Far:nuer's Bank(27 Barb. ) was decided.

The distinction as here made,
defraud,

which the

The distinction between voluntary

and conveyances

this doctiine,

some confusion

is

that rwjtuality of intent to

on the part of grantor and Frantee is

not necessary

to render void a voluntary conveyance by a debtor, while,
the conveyance be for a valuable consideration,
ity " is

if

such 1utual-

essential.
With this principle or distinction ii

view,

nearly all of' the apparently conflicting decisions can

be

harmonized.
Absolute mala fides however, need not be prove, by

the

creditors when attempting to set aside a conveyance as
fraudule:nt.

As a r:nral rule, it may be said, tnat if the

purcase be made by a person having knowledge of the fraudulentLt.nt of the gr ntor, or, such knwoledge as ought
reasonably

to have put him on inquiry,

and such inquiry

'vould have disclosed the fraudulent intent of the grantor,
he is

not entitled

to protection,

even though he bought in

a

actual good faith, with no intent to defraud and for a v.liable consideration.
01

The hearty copperation

of every member

society, to lend his aid in discountenancing fraudulent

practices, is due to the social body of which 1.e is a member,
anti,

if he is nepligent in the exercise of this obligation,

he alone :ust suffer by his default.
The rule as above given has perhaps one exception,
of transfers to creditors in
If

there is

Jischar{Fe of- prior indebtedness.

no actual fraud on the part of the creditor,

courts will uphold tie transfer,

even

of

the

though the grantee

knew of trhe fraudulent intent of the grantor.
so held,

that

It

nas been

even Nwhere the debt has been barred by tne statu-te

limi tation .

The doctrine that a creitor
of his grantor'b fr'aud,

Las been liiited

debt was the s ole consideration for
conveys'nce is

to cases -iihere t1 le

the transfer.

v'',

e

the

for tne joint purpose of paying an ii-debted- .es

and of puting tLe grantor's
other creditors,
the

not charged with notice

is

it

-ill

properly beyond tlie r

be void, as fr~ujul,,t,

Lc '

of

except as to

-:,.ount of tIe actual indebtedness.
Cohen vs. Kelly, (35 'uper. Ct. Rep. )
1len vs. 3ushnell, (1 Hun, 319)
58 Barb., 339;
12 Hun, 303.
Vith this one restriction,

a creditor is

alw eys at lib-

erty to receive property from his debtor in payment of Jiis
debt;

It is not ipso facto a fraudulent act to prefer one

creditor over another.
14 Hun, 172;
4 Denio, 113;
1- VVend., 237;
It has been held that a conveyance alsolute on its
face, but intentded as security for a debt to a bona fide
creditor is not fraudulent a& to other creditors.
Riguey vs. Talmage, (17

iow. r., L)&3)

The question of bona fides is a iues-tion of fact and
all the circumstances of the transaction will be considered
in rendering a decision.

The adequacy or inadequacy of the

consideration is sometimes tae controlling question;if the

consideration is

the conveyance will be

Frossly inadequate,

set aside.
Burden of Proof.
the vendor retains possession

If

presuaption of fraud arises,

of

tne

anr, the ONUS is

a

property,

on the vendee
no

is

of the case that there

to show from the circumstances
froud.
iill's

cases of voluntary conveyances,

In
,onee

Ch.,32C.

to show that, at the time

t

on the

the burden is

making -I

the do-

gitt,

nor was solvent and retained sufficient property to pay his
then existing de ts.
8 Cowen, 403;
15 Wend., 683;
2-1 N.Yf., 623;
Where the conveyance is

in

the form of

an assignment

for the benefit of creditors, the burden of proof is
contesting creditors,
trary to law and

on the

to prove tnat the assig7nment was con-

fraudulent,

or that the assignor is

sol-

ven t.
If
tion,

the conveyance

the ONUS is

is

founded on a v:luable considera-

on those 4ho seek its

impeachment.

portant case on this subject is

the case of Newman vs.

dell(-13 Barb.,448),

said:

where it

is

'The

rule is

An im-

well

Cor-

settled, that, to, make a conveyance fraudulent , fraud, or
fraudulent intent must be shown on the part of
as w 1
fraud,
inr

Vvhere conveyances

as the grantor.
and

the

cant:e

are attacked for

there are many facts and circu:.stances surround-

Lne case which cast a suspicion upon the transaction,

the defendants should be prepard
of unfairness;
be entitled
ences

iich

to ::1eet the allegations

they fail to do ,o,

and it

Lie plaintitf

will

to tae benefit of all of the unfavorable inferiay legit imately be drawn from their neglect and

the generl featur-

of

the case.

The denial of a party

charged with fraud that tnere was any intention to defraud
the plaintiff can scarcely be considered a,
than an expression of opinion of
fraud,

anything more

th: party charged with

as to the character of the transaction,

estimate of it.

V.hile

and his own

the party alleging fraud is

bound to

prove it by sufficient evidence, it is not necessary that it
shoul,4 be established by direct and positive proof; resort
may be had to circumstantial evidence."'
The teindency of the courts of
tne case last above cited,

this state,

as shown by

is toward the full realization

of the principle th.at a debtor's pro~erty is a trust fund
for the benefit of nis creditors,and that any attempt to deplete ' is fund will be rendefed ineffectual, so far

s i-ay

be consistent with the rights of third persons,who have,

22

through no fault of their own, been made parties to the debtor's fraud.

The courts of New York,

ing this doctrine very sparingly,

an,

though at first

apply-

even then reluctantly,

are eagerly striving for tie lead:.rship in this,

the univer-

sal march against fraudulent practices in the affairs of
bus ine ss.

